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ABSTRACT: Many states have recently made or are considering changes to their teacher
retirement systems. However, little is known about how teachers value various elements of their
retirement benefits versus other aspects of their jobs and compensation. To help alleviate this gap,
we use a discrete choice stated preferences experiment embedded in a nationally representative
survey of teachers to estimate their willingness-to-pay for various retirement plan characteristics
and other non-salary job components. We find that teachers would be indifferent between a
traditional pension and alternative retirement plan designs if the alternatives were paired with 2 to
3 percent salary increases. Our results indicate that experience is a significant mediator of
retirement plan preferences. While more experienced teachers are willing to pay more to keep their
traditional pension plans, inexperienced teachers do not have strong preferences around retirement
plan type. However, teachers’ willingness-to-pay for traditional pension plans is less than their
willingness-to-pay for many other elements of their compensation, including the value of
retirement benefits, retirement age, salary growth, healthcare coverage, and Social Security
enrollment.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Retirement benefits are an important part of teachers’ compensation packages and millions
of retired teachers rely on government-sponsored pension plans for their livelihood. Unfortunately,
states and school districts have not set enough money aside to fully cover the benefits teachers
have already earned. Teachers’ pensions in the United States are only 72 percent funded on average
and have total unfunded liabilities exceeding $600 billion, a sum that is likely to increase in the
coming years as plans adopt more conservative assumptions and grapple with a challenging
investment environment (McGee, 2019; Novy‐Marx & Rauh, 2011; Public Plans Data, 2020). As
a result of these funding shortfalls, annual per-pupil teacher retirement costs have nearly tripled
since 2004, rising from $547 to $1,520, and now account for 11 percent of the total per-pupil
education expenditures (Costrell, 2020). Soaring pension costs crowd out other government
expenditures, leaving less money to pay today’s teachers, affecting both take-home salary and
benefits (Kim et al., 2020; McGee, 2016; Nation, 2018).
In recent years, many states have changed teachers’ retirement benefits to stem rising costs.
Most changes to teachers’ retirement plans maintain the traditional final-average-salary defined
benefit (FAS) design but alter parameters like retirement age, how much teachers earn for each
year of work, and how much teachers contribute to the plan. Several states have considered but
few have adopted (e.g., Kansas, Washington, etc.) alternative pension plan designs like defined
contribution (DC), cash balance (CB), and hybrid plans that combine elements of two or more
models.1 Benefit changes disproportionately affect new teachers, substantially reducing the value
of retirement benefits for the next generation of educators.

1

The various plan designs are described more fully in section II.
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These changes to teachers’ retirement plans have the potential to substantially alter teacher
labor markets (e.g., Brown, 2013; Costrell & McGee, 2010). Advocates for generous traditional
FAS pensions contend that benefit reductions and/or plan design changes will harm states’ ability
to recruit and retain talented teachers (Boivie, 2011, 2017). They argue that teachers prefer FAS
plans to alternative plans and that traditional pensions are effective workforce management tools
that incentivize retention and orderly turnover at known retirement ages. However, when offered
alternative plans, a substantial percentage of teachers choose the alternatives, and the evidence on
traditional pensions’ effectiveness as a workforce management tool is limited and mixed at best
(Chingos & West, 2015; Goldhaber et al., 2017).
In the coming years, states and school districts will face increased budgetary pressure
resulting from the COVID-19 recession. Tax revenue is expected to decline sharply in many states
(Dadayan, 2020), and pension costs are likely to rise because the virus’s economic disruption will
make it difficult for pension plans to meet their expected investment return targets. Because of
these factors, pension reform will almost certainly continue to be a topic of conversation in state
legislatures.
To inform the tradeoffs that policymakers face, we designed an experiment to quantify how
teachers’ value various job attributes, including retirement plan design and characteristics. We
administered a survey to a nationally representative sample of teachers from the RAND
Corporation’s American Teacher Panel. We embedded a discrete choice stated preferences
experiment in this survey. The design of our experiment closely follows work by Maestas et al.
(2018) and Mas and Pallais (2017). We repeatedly asked respondents to choose between two jobs
which are the same in every way except they have different randomly assigned salaries and vary
on one non-salary characteristic (e.g., retirement plan type, retirement age, Social Security
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enrollment, etc.). We use respondents’ choices to estimate their willingness-to-pay for specific job
characteristics. We explore potential heterogeneity in preferences based on respondents’ teaching
experience, cognitive ability, conscientiousness, financial literacy, and risk tolerance.2
Our main results indicate that teachers would be accept being enrolled in alternative
retirement plan designs if they are compensated with modest salary increases, marginally larger
expected retirement benefits, or slightly earlier retirement eligibility. We also find that experience
substantially mediates willingness-to-pay for alternative retirement plans. While the most
experienced teachers have a relatively strong preference for FAS plans, early-career teachers are
indifferent between FAS plans and either DC or CB plans. Respondents also placed a significantly
higher value on enrolling in Social Security than they did on maintaining participation in FAS
plans. Additionally, we find that teachers with higher cognitive ability, higher financial literacy,
and lower levels of risk tolerance are willing to pay more for FAS plans.
These findings make three key contributions to the literature. First, our nationally
representative stated preferences experiment allows us to quantify teachers’ preferences for
various job characteristics, including retirement plan design, in dollar terms. While others have
asked teachers about their preferences around retirement plans, we are not aware of any prior
research that estimates willingness to pay using a nationally representative sample (DeArmond &
Goldhaber, 2010; Johnston, 2020). Second, we are the first to estimate teachers’ preferences
around CB plans, which have been considered by several states and was recently adopted for new
hires in Kansas (Costrell, 2019). Finally, we estimate preferences for a variety of job conditions
across a number of potential values. While others infer preferences for deferred versus current
compensation given a real-world policy change (Biasi, 2019; Fitzpatrick, 2015; Goldhaber &

2

Both cognitive ability and conscientiousness serve as proxies for teacher quality (Cheng & Zamarro, 2018;
Hanushek et al., 2018).
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Holden, 2020), their estimates are limited by the specifics of the choice offered to workers. Our
design is more flexible, allowing us to compare a wider variety of retirement plan features and
other job characteristice.
The rest of this paper is organized into six sections. The next section provides background
on teacher pensions and teachers’ preferences for retirement. Section III characterizes our survey
and RAND’s American Teacher Panel. In section IV, we develop our stated preferences
experiment. The following section describes our econometric approach to estimating teachers’
willingness-to-pay for job conditions. The results of our stated preferences experiment are in
section VI. We conclude with policy implications in section VII.
II.

BACKGROUND

Teacher Retirement Plan Overview
The vast majority of teachers participate in FAS retirement plans that base benefits on years
of service and end-of-career salary (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019).3 As noted above, these
plans have proven challenging to manage in a fiscally sustainable way, leading to rising costs and
multiple rounds of benefit changes for teachers. However, they may still be valuable if they offer
positive labor market effects. This section describes the specifics of FAS plans as well as the
alternative plan designs we model in our stated preferences experiment.
Under FAS systems, teachers are eligible to receive a set annual benefit for the remainder
of their life once they reach the plan’s retirement eligibility thresholds, which are generally defined
in terms of age and years of service. A teacher’s annual retirement benefit is determined by first
multiplying their years of service in the system at retirement by the plan’s benefit multiplier to get
their replacement rate (i.e., the percentage of their pre-retirement salary that their benefit will

Teachers’ end-of-career salaries, or final average salaries, are typically the teachers’ average salary over
the last 3 to 5 years of teachers’ careers.
3
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replace). To calculate a teacher’s annual benefit, their replacement rate is multiplied by their
average salary over their last few years in the classroom. The key features of FAS plans that we
model in our experiment are the retirement eligibility thresholds (i.e., retirement age) and the
replacement rate.
Benefits under FAS plans are typically backloaded, meaning teachers earn relatively
meager benefits through much of their careers and then the value of those benefits increases
dramatically as they approach retirement eligibility. As a result of backloading, pension accruals
make up a large share of total compensation for highly-experienced teachers (McGee & Winters,
2017). While FAS plans work well for teachers who spend a full career in a single retirement
system (e.g. state), these plans often leave teachers in a retirement insecure position for much of
their careers (Aldeman & Johnson, 2015). These plans also create strong incentives to work until
retirement eligibility and then to leave the classroom. These incentives are blunt and are not always
aligned with schools’ labor market needs or individual teachers’ desire to leave before or work
after retirement eligibility (Costrell & Podgursky, 2009).
DC and CB plans are often considered as alternatives to FAS plans. DC plans, such as
private sector 401(k) plans, base benefits on how much money has accrued in individual accounts
from employer and employee contributions and investment returns. CB plans are a type of defined
benefit plan where benefits accrue like a DC plan but that offers a minimum guaranteed benefit.
Both alternative plan types can be designed to be cost equivalent to any FAS plan. The
primary differences between the various plan types are 1) how investment risk is distributed and
2) how teachers earn benefits across their careers. Because they tie benefits more closely to
investment returns, the alternative plans generally reduce government cost uncertainty (Costrell,
2019; Costrell & Podgursky, 2009). On the other hand, both alternatives place more direct
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investment risk on participating teachers. FAS plans have similar investment risks, but the
associated costs are only born by teachers indirectly through crowd out effects on salary and job
conditions and reduced retirement benefits for young and new teachers.
The backloaded nature of FAS plans is also risky for teachers because, if they do not work
a full career under a single system, they are often left with meager savings, placing them in a
retirement insecure position. Both DC and CB plans offer more even benefit accrual, albeit with
somewhat lower maximum benefit levels for full-career teachers. Theoretical evidence suggests
that teachers, especially early-career teachers, may prefer earning benefits more evenly across their
careers to limit the risk of leaving the profession early with little to show for it (McGee & Winters,
2018).
Preferences and Willingness-to-Pay for Retirement
Although we are not the first to estimate preferences using survey methodology (e.g.,
DeArmond & Goldhaber, 2010; Horng, 2009; Johnson et al., 2012; Johnston, 2020; Ladd, 2011;
Viano et al., 2019), the literature on teachers’ preferences around retirement benefits is quite
limited. We only identified six studies and only four of these studies were related to preferences
around differing retirement plan types. Two of these studies observed teachers’ behavior to
evaluate their preferences for retirement and found that teachers place a higher value on their
current compensation than future compensation through retirement benefits (Biasi, 2019;
Fitzpatrick, 2015).
Two additional studies evaluate revealed preferences for retirement plan types in
Washington State and Florida (Chingos & West, 2015; Goldhaber & Grout, 2016). Both states
allow teachers to choose to enroll in either a FAS plan or a hybrid FAS/DC plan for Washington
teachers or a DC plan for Florida teachers. The default retirement plan in Washington was the FAS
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prior to 2007 when the default changed to the hybrid DB/DC plan. The majority of teachers
enrolled in the hybrid plan. Younger teachers in Washington were more likely to choose the hybrid
plan than the FAS plan (Goldhaber & Grout, 2016).
The default retirement plan in Florida was the FAS plan until 2018 and most teachers
enrolled in it. Older teachers in Florida were more likely to opt into the DC plan (Chingos & West,
2015). The majority of newly hired government employees, which would include teachers,
enrolled in the DC plan when it became the default in 2018 (State Board of Administration of
Florida, 2020). Higher-quality teachers were more likely to enroll in alternative retirement plans
(Chingos & West, 2015; Goldhaber & Grout, 2016).
Using a survey in Washington State, DeArmond and Goldhaber (2010) find that teachers
prefer DC plans to FAS plans and that this preference was larger for teachers with less than 15
years of experience. Their survey question specifies that traditional pensions are DB plans and
provide guaranteed benefits, while DC plans are similar to 401(k) or 403(b) plans and are more
portable. Washington State uses a traditional FAS plan as well as a hybrid FAS/DC plan. It is
reasonable to expect that early-career teachers may have a preference for the portability that DC
plans afford. However, the preference for DC plans may be due to the fact that the state already
has a DC component in its existing retirement plan, which allows teachers to be more familiar with
how DC plans operate for teachers compared to traditional FAS plans. Thus, it is unclear how
applicable DeArmond and Goldhaber’s results are to other states.
The only other survey work that estimates teachers’ preferences for retirement and relates
to this paper is Johnston (2020). Johnston estimates teachers’ stated preferences and willingnessto-pay in a single school district outside Houston, TX, using a similar discrete choice experiment
to this paper. Teachers in the school district choose between two hypothetical job offers where

8

several job conditions randomly vary. Johnston’s job conditions include salary, salary growth,
retirement plan type, replacement rate, health insurance, and class size among a variety of other
conditions. He finds that teachers are willing to pay for higher replacement rates, DC plans, lower
health insurance premiums, and smaller class sizes. Willingness-to-pay estimates for this Houstonarea school district indicate that teachers would equate switching to a DC plan from a DB plan and
a $900 raise. He does not find that experience mediates this preference.
III.

DATA

We developed an approximately 15-minute survey focusing on teachers’ knowledge of,
preparation for, and preferences around retirement. We adapted questions from two of the 2018
Health and Retirement Study’s survey modules: the Retirement and Pension Plan module and the
Retirement and Social Security module. The following section will go into greater detail regarding
our retirement stated preferences questions. The survey also included previously validated scales
designed to measure financial literacy, personality, numeracy, and risk tolerance (Frederick, 2005;
John et al., 1991; Kimball et al., 2008; Lipkus et al., 2001; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011; Toplak et
al., 2014).
We collect data from the RAND Corporation’s nationally representative American Teacher
Panel (ATP); survey administration was between February 10 and March 16, 2020. The ATP
includes approximately 29,000 active respondents teaching in public K-12 schools. Teachers are
recruited to the ATP using probabilistic sampling methods. The ATP drew a random sample of
schools and purchased schools’ rosters of teachers from a vendor before randomly sampling
teachers within those schools to invite to participate in the panel (Robbins et al., 2018). For our
study, we invited a total of 9,904 teachers and obtained a response rate of 55 percent. Our sample
included both a nationally representative sample of teachers as well as samples representative of
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the following seven areas: Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, New York State, New York
City, and Texas.
The final sample included 5,464 completed responses surveys. From these, we excluded
respondents from our analytical sample if they reported extreme values related to earnings,
birthyears, age when entering the teaching workforce, or experience in- and out-of-state.4 With
these restrictions in place, our analysis sample consisted of 5,111 respondents. Respondents were
compensated for their time at a rate of $1 per minute of the expected time to complete the survey
for a total of $15.
Survey Questions and Scales
Our survey includes several previously validated scales to explore potential heterogeneity
in respondents’ willingness-to-pay for different job characteristics. We use measures for
respondent’s cognitive ability and level of conscientiousness. These scales serve as proxies for
teacher quality (Cheng & Zamarro, 2018; Hanushek et al., 2018). The constructs are also
associated with retirement saving (e.g. Banks & Oldfield, 2007; Letkiewicz & Fox, 2014). To
measure teachers’ cognitive ability, we include the 8 item Lipkus Numeracy Scale (Lipkus et al.,
2001) and the 5 item Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2014). Correct
responses are counted to build two measures of cognitive ability, which we combine using a factor
analysis with a varimax (orthogonal) rotation. We retain a single factor where both measures load
equally. To measure how conscientious teachers are, our survey includes the 44 item Big 5
inventory for personality traits (John et al., 1991).5 Responses to the Big 5 questions are on a 5-

4
We excluded 5.2 percent of respondents for reporting earnings over $200,000, 5.4 percent of respondents
with reported birthyears prior to 1935, 0.4 percent that had potential ages when entering the teaching workforce (age
minus total experience) under age 20, and 4.7 percent if they reported more experience within their current state of
residence than they reported in total. Given that many respondents met more than one exclusion criterion, we removed
a total of 6.5 percent of the potential sample.
5
The Big 5 inventory has been validated in a number of samples (John et al., 2008; John & Srivastava, 1999).
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point Likert scale. We average responses to the 9 questions that capture conscientiousness to
generate a single measure. Larger values indicate higher levels of cognitive ability or
conscientiousness.
We measure financial literacy using a 3-question battery from Lusardi and Mitchell (2011).
The 3 questions are related to the financial concepts of compounding interest rates, inflation, and
“risk diversification.” Correctly responding to these questions is associated with a higher
likelihood of planning for retirement (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007). The 3 questions are multiple
choice, and all include an option for “don’t know.” We consider “don’t know” to be an incorrect
response and simply count the number of correct responses for each respondent to construct our
financial literacy measure.
We also construct a measure of risk tolerance following the work of Kimball et al (2008).
Respondents answer 2 or 3 questions with the same prompt. Respondents are asked to pick between
two jobs: the first job guarantees lifetime income for the family and the second job would have a
50 percent chance of doubling lifetime income and a 50 percent chance of cutting it by a third.
Respondents picking the job with a guaranteed lifetime income are asked if they would take the
job guaranteeing lifetime income again or a job where the potential cut to lifetime income is 20
percent. Those that choose the guaranteed lifetime income a second time are asked to pick between
the job with the guaranteed income and a job where the potential cut is 10 percent. Conversely,
respondents initially indicating that they would prefer the job with a potential income cut of onethird are offered the same guaranteed income as previously, but the second job could result in
lifetime income cut by half. Those respondents still willing to take the job with a risky lifetime
income are offered the initial same guaranteed income and an uncertain income where the potential
cut is 75 percent of their lifetime income. Respondents fall into one of six categories of risk
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tolerance. These categories correspond with the potential lifetime pay cut being less than 10
percent, between 10 and 20 percent, between 20 and 33 percent, 33 percent and 50 percent, 50
percent and 75 percent, and greater than 75 percent.
Sample Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for our analytical sample. Over 75 percent of
respondents are female. White teachers make up 84 percent of the sample while black and Hispanic
teachers each comprise 8 percent of the sample. The average age of our respondents is 44 with a
standard deviation of 10 and a half years. The age range of our sample is 24 to 81. On average,
teachers had a total of 15.7 years of experience and 14.7 years of experience within their current
state of residence. Using the average age and average total experience as benchmarks, the average
teacher in our sample would have started teaching at age 29. Our sample has no first-year teachers
but 9 percent of the sample has between zero and five years of experience. Teachers average
reported salary is approximately $63,000 and a standard deviation of approximately $22,000. We
classify 44 percent of teachers as teaching in elementary schools and 56 percent in secondary
schools.6
Our analytic sample uses the top end of the Likert-type conscientious scale frequently,
answers 2 or more of the financially literacy questions correctly, and prefers less risky income.
Respondents answered, on average, 4.5 of the 8 Lipkus Numeracy questions correctly.
Respondents fared worse on the Cognitive Reflections Test with the average number of correct
answers at 1.8 out of 5. On the 1 to 5 conscientiousness scale, respondents rated themselves as
Our sample’s descriptive statistics match the general teaching population’s descriptive statistics well
(Hussar et al., 2020). Our sample has slightly fewer Hispanic teachers than the general population, but also has more
white, black, and Asian teachers. Our sample reports a base salary nearly $6,000 higher than the general population’s
average base salary, but this is likely attributable to the fact that our sample is more experienced than the general
population. The general population is split relatively evenly between elementary and secondary teachers whereas our
sample has a larger share of secondary teachers. Analyses will use probability weights to make our sample nationally
representative.
6
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quite conscientious with an average value of 4.13. The standard deviation on self-reported
conscientiousness is 0.55. Over half of the sample correctly answered all three financial literacy
questions, and another 31 percent of the sample answered only one question incorrectly. One third
of respondents were unwilling to risk a 10 percent pay cut to double their lifetime income, while
another third of the sample would not risk a 20 percent pay cut. A combined 10 percent of the
sample would be willing to risk having their lifetime income reduced by a third or higher.
IV.

STATED PREFERENCES EXPERIMENT

We use a discrete choice stated preferences experiment following Maestas et al. (2018) and
Mas and Pallais (2017) to understand teachers’ preferences concerning various job conditions.
Stated preferences experiments, also sometimes called a conjoint analysis, originated in marketing
but have spread to several other fields (Johnston, 2020). Part of the reason for their growing
popularity is their success in predicting actual behavior (for example, see Hainmueller et al., 2015;
Wiswall & Zafar, 2018; Wlömert & Eggers, 2016).
In our experiment, we repeatedly provide teachers with two hypothetical job offers and ask
them to indicate which job they prefer. Each job has eight conditions that can vary: salary, type of
retirement plan, the retirement plan’s expected salary replacement rate7, retirement eligibility age,
annual salary growth, class size, health insurance coverage, and Social Security participation 8. For
each hypothetical job offer pair, salary and one other characteristic varies. Respondents are
instructed to assume all other job conditions, whether explicitly listed in the job offers or not, are
the same.

As explained above, a retiree’s replacement rate is the ratio of the retiree’s benefit to salary. It is the
proportion of salary that benefits “replace.” If a retiree earned $75,000 as a teacher, a 70 percent replacement rate
would yield annual benefits of $52,500 (75,000*0.70).
8
Approximately 60 percent of teachers participate in Social Security (Kan & Aldeman, 2014).
7
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For each job condition except salary, we chose a baseline value that is either the midpoint
of the potential values or the most common real-world value. For example, the baseline value of
retirement plan type is FAS, the most common teacher retirement plan type. One of the job offers
presented to respondents is always comprised of the baseline values for each non-salary job
condition. For the other job offer, we randomly select and vary one of the seven non-salary job
conditions and set the remaining six conditions equal to their baseline value. Salaries for both jobs
are randomly generated deviations from the respondent’s reported current salary.
Each respondent was asked to choose between two randomly selected jobs eight times. To
supply to the job offers for the survey, we created a database of 108,000 hypothetical job offer
pairs.9 Job offers presented to respondents are randomly chosen from our database with
replacement, which allows for offers to potentially be repeated in the sample. Individual
respondents may be asked to choose among job pairs varying the same job condition more than
once and may not see offers varying some of the conditions at all.
We constructed the hypothetical job offers using randomly generated salaries and a
randomly selected non-salary job characteristic. Offers are calibrated to prevent one job from
strictly dominating the other. For example, a job that offers a 73 percent replacement rate and a
$70,000 annual salary would strictly dominate another job with a 70 percent replacement rate and
a $68,000 salary. We assume, other things held equal, that teachers would always choose a job
with a higher salary if it also had a higher replacement rate, earlier retirement age, higher salary
growth rate, smaller average class size, and additional health insurance. See Appendix A for
additional information regarding hypothetical job comparison construction.

9

We arrived at 108,000 hypothetical job comparisons by multiplying the 8 times a respondent would indicate
a job preference times the 13,500 potential respondents. Since we sample from the database with replacement, we
increased the number of potential respondents beyond the number of teachers we sent the survey to in order to reduce
the incidence of repeated hypothetical job comparisons.
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For each job condition, Table 2 contains the wording used to present it in the survey, its
potential and baseline values, and information about how often it varied in the survey as well as
how often each value was selected. Baseline values for each job condition are noted in the potential
values column. The number of times that each job condition was randomly selected to be the one
that varies in a job offer is provided in parentheses in the job condition column. Each job condition
was selected to vary in a job offer between 5,727 and 5,980 times. The frequency that each job
condition value is displayed is in the fourth column. Within each job condition, there is an
approximately uniform distribution of display frequencies across condition values.
The final column of table 2 shows the probability that respondents choose a job with a
given job condition value. The most substantial threat to the validity of our experimental design is
if certain job characteristics dominate (i.e., are always chosen). For example, if respondents always
choose jobs with the higher salaries, it would imply that the range for salary was set too high, and
we would get very little information from our experiment. However, we saw substantial variation
in respondent choices across condition values, indicating that our survey values were well
calibrated to yield useful information.
Respondents patterns of choosing across various condition values also matched our
expectations. For job conditions with ordered condition values, we expected respondents to be
more likely to choose jobs with more favorable values, and that was the observed choosing pattern.
For example, respondents chose higher annual salary growth more often as the values increased.
Teachers chose job offers with a 2 percent annual salary growth 62 percent of the time and jobs
with 8 percent annual salary growth 85 percent of the time.
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V.

ECONOMETRIC APPROACH

The raw proportions of respondents choosing specific job conditions, presented above,
gives us an overall idea of which job attributes teachers prefer, but it does not tell us how much
teachers prefer those job attributes. Even though we force respondents to choose jobs at the
expense of higher salaries, the simple proportions mask heterogeneity in the gap between the two
salary offers. Following the approach of Maestas et al. (2018), we estimate teachers’ willingnessto-pay for the seven job conditions previously described.
We assume that teachers choose between a set of jobs based on a latent utility model where
unobserved utility is a linear and additively separable function of the jobs’ non-salary conditions
and the jobs’ corresponding salary:
′
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛽 + 𝛿 ln 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(1)

where 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 is individual 𝑖’s latent utility for job choice 𝑗 in the individual’s job choice set 𝑡. While
teachers may weigh several job offers in job choice set 𝑡, our experiment restricts the set to only
two jobs. Within choice sets, only one job condition and salary vary. Non-salary job conditions
′
are 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
and 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the salary. We use the natural logarithm of salary to facilitate interpretation of

our effects as percent changes and since the salary offers in our experiment are tied to teachers’
reported salaries and there is substantial heterogeneity in salaries across our national sample and
within states due to salary schedules. We assume that 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an Extreme Value Type I random
variable.
We model the probability that an individual chooses job choice 𝑗 over job choice 𝑘 in
choice set 𝑡 as:
′
′
𝑃(𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 > 𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑡 ) = Λ[(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
− 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡
)𝛽 + 𝛿(ln 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ln 𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑡 )]

(2)
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where Λ[⋅] denotes the cumulative logistic distribution. We should be able to identify 𝛽 and 𝛿 in
equation (2) since each non-salary job condition and salary is randomly selected. Despite our
randomization, there could be other state level unobserved differences that are associated with the
jobs that our respondents select. For example, most states use FAS plans, which may lead teachers
to develop a preference for these plans owing to their familiarity with how these plans function.
To account for these differences, we include fixed effects for states. Preferences may also be
dynamic based on how many job choices respondents have already made. For example,
respondents may be willing to pay to retire at age 57, but the strength of that preference may differ
if respondents have seen a previous job offer with an age 55 retirement age. To combat this type
of bias, we also include question fixed effects in some models.
Consider a non-salary job condition 𝑐 and the marginal utilities for this job condition, 𝛽 𝑐 ,
and salary, 𝛿, identified in equation (2). For individual 𝑖, job offer 𝑗 in choice set 𝑡 that included
job condition 𝑐 has expected utility 𝐸(𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 ) = 𝛽 𝑐 + 𝛿 ln 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 and job offer 𝑘 in the same choice
set that does not have the job condition has expected utility 𝐸(𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑡 ) = 𝛿 ln 𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑡 . An individual is
indifferent between the two jobs when we fix the salary at 𝑤 and subtract off the individual’s
willingness-to-pay for the job condition:
𝛿 ln 𝑤 = 𝛽 𝑐 + 𝛿 ln(𝑤 − 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐 )

(3)

where the 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐 is the willingness-to-pay for job condition 𝑐. We solve for 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐 in equation (3)
to derive our willingness-to-pay measure:
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐 = 𝑤 [1 − exp (−

𝛽𝑐
𝛿

We report willingness-to-pay estimates as 1 − exp (−
100 [1 − exp (−

𝛽𝑐
𝛿

)].

𝛽𝑐
𝛿

(4)

) and interpret these effects as

)] percent salary increases a respondent is willing to forgo to receive job
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attribute 𝑐. We use the delta method to calculate standard errors in equation (4) and cluster the
standard errors for each respondent. Statistical inference tests the null hypothesis that the
willingness-to-pay estimates are different from zero; under this null hypothesis, respondents would
be indifferent to the job condition. We include probability weights to ensure our sample is
nationally representative
Our decision to predefine the relationships between several job conditions and salary to
avoid dominant offers has an important implication for our willingness-to-pay measure. By
construction, willingness-to-pay estimates for increasing replacement rate, increasing salary
growth, and adding dental and optical coverage to health insurance plans will be positive and
estimates increasing the retirement age, increasing class size, and health insurance plans that cover
a lower share of costs will be negative. The statistical significance and magnitudes of the
willingness-to-pay estimates for these job conditions are still policy relevant despite the predefined
signs on estimates.
We investigate heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay for job conditions based on
respondents’ experience, cognitive ability, levels of conscientiousness, financial literacy, and risk
tolerance. To do so, we interact the differences in job conditions for a choice set with experience,
cognitive ability, conscientiousness, financial literacy, and risk tolerance in equation (2).
Estimates of these interaction terms would represent the differential effect of teachers’
preferences for the job condition for teachers not in the reference group for these mediators relative
to teachers in the reference group. To translate this differential into a willingness-to-pay estimate,
we add the interaction term to the reference group’s preference in the numerator of the exponential
in equation (4). For example, the willingness-to-pay for an early-career teacher, denoted by the
superscript 𝑒, for job condition 𝑐 is 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐𝑒 = 𝑤 [1 − exp (−

𝛽 𝑐 +𝛽 𝑐𝑒
𝛿

)] where 𝛽 𝑐𝑒 is the differential
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preference of the job condition for early-career teachers. We interpret this effect similarly to the
overall effect.
VI.

RESULTS

We begin with the results from our stated preferences experiment that compare teachers’
willingness-to-pay for different retirement plan types. Table 3 contains overall willingness-to-pay
estimates for DC and CB plans relative to FAS plans. These values are calculated using the nonlinear transformation in equation (4) based on the estimates from the logit model in equation (2).
The first column is our base specification while the second column includes question fixed
effects to control for changes in willingness-to-pay as respondents answer more questions. In
column 3, we include state fixed effects to control for any residual variation in preferences that
could be correlated with respondents’ state of residence retirement systems options. Column 4
includes both state and question fixed effects. We prefer the model in column 4 since we expect
heterogeneity across states and questions.
Our results indicate that, on average, respondents would need to be compensated with a 2.7
percent pay increase to be indifferent between being enrolled in a DC plan versus a FAS plan.
Similarly, we estimate that respondents would be indifferent between a CB plan and a FAS plan if
the CB plan were paired with a 1.9 percent salary increase. All estimates are statistically different
from zero at the 99 percent confidence level.
Our experimental design sought to minimize bias from preconceived notions about various
plan types as well as differences in plan generosity in two ways. First, we did not identify the
retirement plan types by their common names (e.g., defined contribution). Instead, we described
how teachers would earn benefits under each type of plan and asked them to choose based on the
description.
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Second, respondents were told that the plans were expected to deliver similar benefits at
retirement. Specifically, they were instructed that, for both the FAS and alternative plans,
retirement benefits would be expected to replace 70 percent of their end of career salary, that they
would be eligible to retire with full benefits at age 60, and that they would be enrolled in Social
Security. The only differences between retirement plan types were how respondents earn benefits
and the risk respondents perceive is associated with each type of plan based solely on the plan’s
description, both of which are addressed in our plan descriptions.
In contrast to some of the previous literature (DeArmond & Goldhaber, 2010; Johnston,
2020), our results indicate that respondents place some value on, or have more comfort with, the
way benefits accrue under a FAS plan and/or perceive alternative plans as being somewhat riskier.
While we find that teachers would need to be compensated to be indifferent between FAS plans
and alternative plan types, our results suggest that teachers may be open to plan design change if
paired with modest salary increases.
Owing to the backloaded nature of FAS plans, there is likely heterogeneity in willingnessto-pay for retirement plan types based on experience. Table 4 presents willingness-pay-estimates
for enrolling in alternative retirement plan types instead of traditional FAS plans mediated by
experience. We group respondents based on experience quartiles: respondents in the first
experience quartile (termed “early-career”) have 8 or fewer years of experience, respondents in
the second and third quartiles (termed “mid-career”) have between 9 and 21 years of experience,
and fourth quartile respondents (termed “late-career”) have 22 or more years of experience.
We find that teachers’ willingness-to-pay for a FAS plan relative to either alternative
retirement plan increases with experience. Respondents designated as early-career (lowexperience) are indifferent between enrolling in either a DC or a CB plan rather than a traditional
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FAS plan. Mid-career respondents would need to be compensated with a 2.7 percent pay increase
to be indifferent between a DC and FAS plan, while a 2 percent pay increase would be required
for a CB plan. Late-career respondents, unsurprisingly, had the strongest preference for FAS plans.
Our results indicate that late-career teachers would equate enrolling in a DC plan with a 4.8 percent
pay cut, while enrolling in a CB plan is equivalent to a 4.3 percent pay cut.
This observed pattern of heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay coincides with the backloaded
nature of FAS plans. Teachers often do not earn substantial benefits under a FAS plan until they
approach the retirement eligibility. Late-career respondents who have accrued the most benefits
would have the strongest preferences for FAS plans. New and early-career teachers, who have not
yet earned valuable pension benefits, are indifferent among the plan types.
Relative Valuation of Retirement Plan Types and Other Job Characteristics
Policymakers face numerous tradeoffs when designing teachers’ compensation packages,
and no element exists in a vacuum. When weighing these various tradeoffs, it is important to
understand teachers’ relative preferences across job characteristics. This section provides
willingness-to-pay estimates for the other 7 job attributes in our experiment and relates those
preferences to our estimates for retirement plan type.
There are at least two reasons why the relative willingness-to-pay estimates provided in
this section are important. First, our main results provide estimates for the required raises to
compensate teachers for enrolling in alternative retirement plans instead of FAS plans. However,
states or school districts could choose to compensate teachers via changes to other retirement plan
features or job characteristics (e.g., replacement rates or the retirement age).
Second, policymakers facing budget shortfalls may have to consider making changes to
teacher compensation without giving anything to teachers in exchange. Proponents of FAS plans
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argue that policymakers should protect these plans and make budget cuts elsewhere. When faced
with such decisions, comparing willingness-to-pay estimates for retirement plans versus other job
characteristics gives policymakers helpful information about teachers’ relative valuations of
various elements of teachers’ compensation packages.
Table 5 provides willingness-to-pay estimates for the other 7 job attributes we included in
our experiment (column 1). The table also includes estimates for how much each job characteristic
would need to change to make teachers indifferent between alternative plan types and a FAS plan
(columns 2 and 3).10 All estimates in this table come from our preferred model that includes state
and question fixed effects.
Since states that may undertake retirement reform are likely to enroll all new hires and may
enroll early-career teachers into an alternative plan design, we evaluate willingness-to-pay
heterogeneity based on experience for the other job conditions in our experiment and report results
for salary growth and health insurance in Table 6.11 This table is analogous to Table 5. The panels
correspond to different job conditions from the experiment.
In table 5, we estimate that a one percentage point replacement rate increase in retirement
is equivalent to a 1.6 percent salary increase. This estimate implies that respondents would be
indifferent between enrolling in a DC plan if they are compensated with replacement rate that is
1.7 percentage points higher than the replacement rate in a corresponding FAS plan. Within our

10

We say that a respondent would be indifferent between enrolling in an alternative retirement plan instead
of a FAS plan if the alternative plan is paired with some change in another job attribute. Formally, let 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇 represent
the willingness-to-pay for either alternative plan design. A respondent is indifferent between taking a job with an
alternative retirement plan if the job also came with some other altered job condition 𝑐, 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇 + 𝛾 𝑐 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐 = 0,
where 𝛾 𝑐 represents how much the corresponding job condition changes. The relative valuation of plan type
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇

willingness-to-pay for retirement plan type is then 𝛾 𝑐 = − (
). To compensate teachers for enrolling in non-FAS
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑐
plans with changes in non-salary job attributes, willingness-to-pay estimates for non-salary job attributes are inversely
related to how much the non-salary job attribute would have to change. In other words, the less respondents value a
job characteristic, the more it would have to change to offset enrolling in a FAS-alternative instead of FAS plans.
11
We do not find evidence of heterogeneity based on experience in willingness to pay for replacement rate,
retirement age, class size, or Social Security. These results are available upon request.
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experiment’s context, the DC plan would replace 71.7 percent of salary whereas the FAS plan
would replace 70 percent. The corresponding compensating differential for a CB plan would be a
1.2 percentage point replacement rate increase. Early-career respondents would be indifferent
between enrolling in a DC plan if it came with a half percentage point increase in full retirement
replacement rate relative to a competing FAS plan and would be indifferent between CB and FAS
if the CB plan had a 0.2 percent lower replacement rate.
We estimate that teachers would be indifferent between lowering the retirement age by one
year and a 2.4 percent salary increase. This estimate implies that teachers would also be indifferent
between retiring 1.3 and 0.79 years earlier if they were to enroll in a DC or CB plan, respectively,
as opposed to a FAS plan. In other words, teachers would be willing to enroll in an alternative plan
if that plan reduces their expected retirement age by one year relative to a FAS plan. Given our
experiments’ parameters, this means teachers enrolled in DC or CB plans would expect to retire at
age 59 rather than our baseline FAS plan’s retirement age of 60. Early-career respondents would
be willing to enroll in a DC plan that has a retirement age 0.33 years earlier than a FAS plan’s
retirement age. To enroll in a CB plan, early-career respondents would forgo retirement by 0.13
years.
Policy propositions to switch retirement plan types could also compensate teachers with
higher rates of salary growth or with reduced class sizes, both of which teachers and teachers’
unions commonly call on state and local policymakers to do (e.g., Weingarten, 2019a, 2019b). Our
respondents are willing to pay 5.7 percent of salary for a one percentage point increase in their
annual salary growth rate and 0.5 percent of salary to decrease average class sizes by one student.
As shown in column 2, teachers would be indifferent between enrolling in a DC plan
instead of a FAS plan if the DC plan was coupled with a 0.47 percentage point increase in their
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salary growth rate or a 5.4 student reduction in their average class size. The CB equivalent
valuations are increasing the rate of salary growth by a third of a percentage point or reducing class
sizes by 3.8 students.
Our estimates in panel A of table 6 indicate that respondents’ willingness-to-pay for salary
growth decreases with experience, but required compensating differentials in terms of salary
growth continue to increase with experience. Mid-career respondents would be indifferent between
enrolling in a FAS-alternative retirement plan if it was associated with between a 0.35 and 0.47
percentage point higher salary growth rate than the salary growth rate associated with a FAS plan.
These compensating differentials rise to nearly 1 percentage point of salary growth for late-career
respondents.
Overall estimates in table 5 show that the teachers in our sample place a higher value on
how much an insurance plan covers expected healthcare costs and whether they have optical and
dental coverage than they place on the type of retirement plan in which they enroll. We estimate
that teachers would require a 16.8 percent salary increase to offset a healthcare plan that covers 60
percent of expected costs instead of a plan that covers 80 percent of costs. Respondents are also
indifferent between a 10.6 percent raise and enrolling in a plan with dental and optical coverage.12
We uncover heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay for health insurance in panels B and C of
table 6. Respondents with more experience are willing to pay more for a health insurance plan that
covers a larger share of health care costs, but mid-career teachers are willing to pay the most for
dental and optical coverage. Regardless of experience, willingness-to-pay estimates for health
insurance is greater than 10 percent of salary.

12

We do not report the DC and CB relative valuations in tables 5 and 6 for health insurance and Social
Security since these job attributes are not defined continuously in our experiment. The relative valuations would be
the willingness-to-pay for retirement plan type as a proportion of willingness-to-pay for health insurance or Social
Security, which is not all that informative of a measure.
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Finally, teachers in our sample place a larger value on enrolling in Social Security than
they do on which type of other retirement plan they are enrolled in. Column 1 of table 5 shows that
respondents are willing to pay 10.7 percent of salary to be enrolled in Social Security. This
willingness-to-pay is especially noteworthy since it exceeds the employer contribution rate to
Social Security of 6.2 percent. In other words, the cost to employers to enroll teachers in Social
Security is 4.5 percentage points lower than how much teachers value Social Security.
Willingness-to-pay for Different Retirement Plan Types Mediated by Cognitive Ability,
Conscientiousness, Financial Literacy, and Risk Tolerance
We estimate the retirement plan type willingness-to-pay distributions for respondents with
differing levels of cognitive ability, conscientiousness, financial literacy, and risk tolerance. These
results are in Table 7. We report estimates from our preferred specification that include state and
question fixed effects. Columns 1 and 4 show the estimates for respondents in the “low” category
for each mediator. Columns 2 and 5 contain estimates for respondents in the “medium” category
for each mediator. Columns 3 and 6 provide estimates of willingness-to-pay for respondents in the
“high” category for each mediator.
Using cognitive ability to proxy for teacher quality, we find significant heterogeneity in
willingness-to-pay for retirement plan type. We group respondents by cognitive ability based on
respondents’ quartile in the cognitive ability distribution. As cognitive ability increases, teachers’
willingness-to-pay for DC plans decreases. Teachers in the bottom cognitive ability quartile are
indifferent between switching from FAS plans to either a DC or CB plan, while teachers in the top
quartile value these plans at a 4.6 or 3.1 percent pay cut, respectively. Even though willingnessto-pay estimates mediated by experience and cognitive ability appear similar in both magnitude
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and direction, there does not appear to be any relationship between these mediators in our sample:
the correlation between experience and cognitive ability is negative 0.01.13
Our second proxy for teacher quality, self-reported conscientiousness, does not explain
much heterogeneity in plan type willingness-to-pay. Apart from low-conscientiousness
respondents’ willingness-to-pay for CB plans, respondents value enrolling in DC and CB plans
instead of FAS plans at between a 2 and 3 percent pay reduction.
We also group respondents based on the number of financial literacy questions they answer
correctly. Low-financial literacy respondents answer 0 or 1 of the 3 financial literacy questions
correctly. Medium-financial literacy respondents correctly answer 2 of the 3 financial literacy
questions, and high-financial literacy respondents answer all 3 financial literacy questions
correctly.14
The most financially literate teachers in our sample are willing to pay more for traditional
pension plans. Respondents answering all 3 financial literacy questions correctly are willing to pay
3.9 percent and 3.4 percent of salary for a FAS plan rather than switch to DC or CB plans,
respectively. Teachers displaying the lowest levels of financial literacy are indifferent between
retirement plans. Moderately financially literate teachers are indifferent between FAS and CB
plans, but are willing to pay 2.2 percent of salary for FAS over DC plans.
We group respondents based on which potential lifetime pay cut they would be willing to
accept from our risk tolerance questions. The questions making up our risk tolerance scale asked

We also conduct Pearson’s chi-squared test of independence to assess if there is a relationship between
experience and cognitive ability within our low, medium, and high groupings of experience and cognitive ability based
on quartiles. We fail to find any evidence that the two mediators are related to one another: the p-value from this test
is 0.303.
14
Per the descriptive statistics in Table 1, approximately 17 percent of respondents would fall in the lowfinancial literacy group, 31 percent would fall into the medium-financial literacy group, and the remaining 53 percent
would be high-financial literacy. Similarly, we consider one third of respondents to have low-risk tolerance, another
third to be medium risk-tolerance, and the remaining third to be high-risk tolerance.
13
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respondents if they would risk taking a job with a varying pay cut to lifetime income in exchange
for the potential to double their lifetime income. Low-risk tolerance respondents are unwilling to
accept the job if the potential cut to respondents’ lifetime income is less than 10 percent, while
medium-risk tolerance respondents are willing to accept the job if the potential lifetime income
cut is between 10 and 20 percent. High-risk tolerance respondents are willing to accept the job
even if the potential cut to respondents’ lifetime income is greater than 20 percent.15
We do not find much evidence of heterogeneity based on risk tolerance in willingness-topay retirement plan types. Respondents with higher levels of risk tolerance are willing to pay less
for traditional FAS plans than respondents with lower levels of risk tolerance. Medium risk
tolerance respondents have the highest willingness-to-pay estimates for both alternative plan types.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Teacher pensions are underfunded by more than $600 billion in the aggregate (McGee,
2019; Novy‐Marx & Rauh, 2011). More resources than ever before are being devoted to paying
down pension debt (Costrell, 2020), squeezing state and local education budgets (McGee, 2016;
Nation, 2018). What’s more, there is mounting evidence that traditional pension plans do not work
well for all teachers (Aldeman & Johnson, 2015; Backes et al., 2016; Costrell & Podgursky, 2009).
As a result, policymakers are exploring alternative retirement plan designs. However, advocates
for traditional pensions often stymie consideration of alternative plans citing teachers’ strong
preferences for final average salary pensions. Unfortunately, up until now little was know about
teachers’ preferences around retirement or strength of those preferences relative to other aspects
of their jobs and compensation.

15

Based on the descriptive statistics in Table 1, we consider one third of respondents to have low-risk
tolerance, another third to be medium risk-tolerance, and the remaining third to be high-risk tolerance.
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This paper addresses this knowledge gap by developing willingness-to-pay estimates based
on a stated preferences experiment embed in a nationally representative survey of public K-12
school teachers. We find that teachers are indifferent between a traditional pension and alternative
plan designs when the alternatives are paired with a 2.7 and 1.9 percent pay increase. This finding
differs somewhat from other literature on teachers’ retirement preferences that finds teachers may
prefer 401(k)-style plans, but the extant literature only considers more localized context of a simgle
state or school dirtrict (DeArmond & Goldhaber, 2010; Johnston, 2020). Corroborating previous
literature, however, we find that experience mediates retirement plan preferences. While more
experienced teachers prefer FAS plans, early-career teachers are indifferent between traditional
pensions and alternative plans.
We also show that teachers place sizable values on other job conditions. Teachers are
willing to trade salary today if it means that their expected retirement benefits will be larger or if
they can retire at a younger ages. They also place a substantial value on being enrolled in Social
Security. In fact, we estimate that teachers have stronger preferences around their expected
retirement benefit, retirement age, and Social Security enrollment than they do for various
retirement plan types.
While our results have the potential to inform policy decisions, there is one key limitation.
Teachers’ stated preferences on a 15-minute survey may differ from their true or revealed
preferences. There is a literature that finds that stated preferences experiments tend to match
revealed preferences in other populations (e.g., Hainmueller et al., 2015; Wiswall & Zafar, 2018;
Wlömert & Eggers, 2016), but none of this previous literature involves teachers or retirement plan
specifically.
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With this limitation in mind, our estimates provide some insights that may be valuable to
policymakers as they grapple with current budgetary challenges. For example, states could reduce
future budgetary risk by placing new teachers in alternative retirement plans and at the same time
offering modest pay raises. In addition, changes to retirement age, expected retirement benefits,
and healthcare coverage are likely to result in larger negative labor market consequences than
retirement plan design changes. Our results also indicate that states whose teachers are not
currently covered by Social Security could reap significant benefit from enrolling them in the
program because teachers appear to value those benefits more than their cost.
States and school districts that face challenging budget situations may have to make
difficult decisions that affect teachers’ job conditions, pay, and benefits. Understanding how
teachers value various aspects of their jobs and compensation can help inform these policy
decisions and minimize potential negative consequences.
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Example of Two Job Offers
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TABLES
Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Female
Hispanic
White
Black
Asian
Age
Total Experience
Beginning Teachers a
Experience in State
Salary
Elementary School
Secondary School
Numerical Ability Score
Cognitive Reflection Test Score
Conscientiousness
Financial Literacy Questions Correct
0
1
2
3
Risk Tolerance
Potential Cut < 0.10
0.10 < Potential Cut < 0.20
0.20 < Potential Cut < 0.33

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

10.48
8.38

24
2

81
52

8.13
22,447

0
0

52
157,000

1.76
1.52
0.55

0
0
2

8
5
5

0.77
0.08
0.84
0.08
0.03
44.08
15.66
0.09
14.65
63,406
0.44
0.56
4.48
1.76
4.13
0.03
0.14
0.31
0.53
0.33
0.33
0.24

0.33 < Potential Cut < 0.50
0.50 < Potential Cut < 0.75
Potential Cut > 0.75

0.05
0.03
0.02
a
Beginning teachers are those with between 0 and 5 years of total experience.
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Table 2: Job Conditions and Values
Job
Condition

Frequency
Value
Appears

Probability of
Choosing Value

baseline

29%

how much money has accumulated in a person’s
individual account from employee contributions,
employer contributions, and investment returns

2,857

72%

employee contributions, employer contributions, and
investment returns with a minimum guarantee

2,870

70%

775
744
755
765
baseline
658

64%
64%
71%
73%
26%
73%

Condition Wording

Potential Values
a formula involving a person’s age, years of service,
and salary

Retirement
Plan Type
(5,727)

Replacement
Rate
(5,817)

Retirement
Age
(5,743)

The retirement plan
bases benefits on
[value].

A teacher who works a
full career in the same
retirement system earns
retirement benefits that
would provide a
monthly check
equivalent to [X]
percent of their end-ofcareer salary.

A teacher who works a
full career in the same
retirement system is
eligible to receive
benefits at age [X].

60
62
65
67
70
73
75
78
80

668
691
761

78%
85%
83%

55
57
60

989
934
baseline

78%
73%
33%

63
65

963
1,002

72%
65%
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Job
Condition

Condition Wording

Potential Values
67
69

Salary
Growth
(5,809)

Salary grows by [X]
percent annually.

Class Size
(5,917)

Teachers have class
sizes of approximately
[X] students.

2
3.5
5
6.5
8

Frequency
Value
Appears
955
900

Probability of
Choosing Value
59%
52%

1,458
1,450
baseline
1,433
1,467

62%
66%
26%
82%
85%

-3
0

2,912
baseline

65%
28%

+3

3,005

78%

2,947
baseline

62%
28%

2,938

82%

baseline

38%

5,980

62%

Health
Insurance
(5,885)

The health insurance
plan would cover [X]
percent of healthcare
costs for the average
person and provide [Y].

X = 60, Y = catastrophic coverage
X = 80, Y = catastrophic coverage

Social
Security
(5,980)

Teachers [value] Social
Security.

contribute to and earn benefits in

X = 80, Y = catastrophic coverage, dental, and optical

do not contribute to or earn benefits in

Notes: Bolded text in the condition wording column is also bolded in the survey to emphasize key elements.
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Table 3: Willingness-to-Pay for Different Retirement Plan Types
WTP
(1)

WTP
(2)

WTP
(3)

WTP
(4)

DC rather than FAS

-0.034***
(0.005)

-0.028***
(0.005)

-0.027***
(0.005)

-0.027***
(0.005)

CB rather than FAS

-0.027***
(0.005)

-0.021***
(0.005)

-0.019***
(0.005)

-0.019***
(0.005)

Question FE
State FE
N

X
40,878

40,878

X

X
X

40,878

40,878

Notes: Willingness-to-pay estimates from equation (4) based on results from logistic regression of
the model in equation (2). Models include all job conditions. Probability weights included.
Standard errors calculated using delta method with clustering by individual in parenthesis; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Willingness-to-Pay for Different Retirement Plan Types Mediated by Experience
Early-Career
(1)

Mid-Career
(2)

Late-Career
(3)

DC rather than FAS

-0.008
(0.010)

-0.027***
(0.007)

-0.048***
(0.011)

CB rather than FAS

0.003
(0.010)

-0.020***
(0.007)

-0.043***
(0.011)

Experience Range

Less than 8

Between 9 and 21

More than 22

Notes: Willingness-to-pay estimates from equation (4) based on results from logistic regression of
the model in equation (2). Models include all job conditions and state and question fixed effects.
N=40,878. Experience range determined using total experience quartiles: early-career respondents
are in the first experience quartile, mid-career respondents are in the second or third experience
quartiles, late-career respondents are in the fourth experience quartile. Probability weights
included. Standard errors calculated using delta method with clustering by individual in
parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Willingness-to-Pay for Job Conditions and Equivalent Valuations with Willingness-toPay for Retirement Plan Type
WTP
(1)

DC Equivalent
Valuation
(2)

CB Equivalent
Valuation
(3)

Replacement Rate

0.016***
(0.001)

1.688

1.188

Retirement Age

-0.024***
(0.001)

-1.125

-0.792

Salary Growth

0.057***
(0.002)

0.474

0.333

Class Size

-0.005***
(0.001)

-5.400

-3.800

Health Insurance:
60% rather than 80%

-0.168***
(0.007)

-

-

Health Insurance: add
in Dental & Optical

0.106***
(0.005)

-

-

Do not Enroll in
Social Security

-0.107***
(0.005)

-

-

Notes: Willingness-to-pay estimates in Column 1 from equation (4) based on results from logistic
regression of the model in equation (2). Model includes retirement plan type and question and state
fixed effects. Estimates of willingness-to-pay for retirement plan type are available in Column 4
of Table 3. Probability weights included. Standard errors calculated using delta method with
clustering by individual in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Column 2 is the required
change in the corresponding job condition that would offset the willingness-to-pay estimate for
DC plans instead of FAS plans. Column 3 is the required change in the corresponding job condition
that would offset the willingness-to-pay estimate for CB plans instead of FAS plans.
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Table 6: Willingness-to-Pay for Retirement Job Conditions mediated by Experience
WTP
(1)

DC Equivalent
Valuation
(2)

CB Equivalent
Valuation
(3)

Panel A: Replacement Rate
Early-Career

0.015***
(0.001)

0.533

-0.200

Mid-Career

0.016***
(0.001)

1.688

1.250

Late-Career

0.017***
(0.001)

2.824

2.529

-0.022***
(0.001)

-0.364

0.136

-0.024***
(0.001)
-0.028***
(0.002)

-1.125

-0.833

-1.714

-1.536

Early-Career

0.062***
(0.003)

0.129

-0.048

Mid-Career

0.057***
(0.002)

0.474

0.351

Late-Career

0.052***
(0.003)

0.923

0.827

Early-Career

-0.007***
(0.002)

-1.143

0.429

Mid-Career

-0.005***
(0.002)

-5.400

-4.000

Late-Career

-0.004
(0.002)

-12.000

-10.750

Panel B: Retirement Age
Early-Career
Mid-Career
Late-Career
Panel C: Salary Growth

Panel D: Class Size
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Table 6 Continued
WTP
(1)

DC Equivalent
Valuation
(2)

Panel E: Health Insurance – 60% rather than 80%
-0.142***
Early-Career
(0.012)

CB Equivalent
Valuation
(3)

-

-

Mid-Career

-0.172***
(0.009)

-

-

Late-Career

-0.187***
(0.013)

-

-

-

-

Panel F: Health Insurance – add in Dental & Optical
0.103***
Early-Career
(0.008)
Mid-Career

0.110***
(0.006)

-

-

Late-Career

0.101***
(0.009)

-

-

Panel G: Do Not Enroll in Social Security
Early-Career

-0.109***
(0.009)

-

-

Mid-Career

-0.104***
(0.007)

-

-

Late-Career

-0.108***
(0.010)

-

-

Notes: Willingness-to-pay estimates from equation (4) based on results from logistic regression of
the model in equation (2). Models include all job characteristics and question and state fixed
effects. N=40,878. Low experience teachers have 8 years or fewer; Medium experience teachers
have between 9 and 21 years; High experience teachers have 22 years or more. Probability weights
included. Standard errors calculated using delta method with clustering by individual in
parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Column 2 is the required change in the corresponding
job condition that would offset the willingness-to-pay estimate for DC plans instead of FAS plans.
Column 3 is the required change in the corresponding job condition that would offset the
willingness-to-pay estimate for CB plans instead of FAS plans.
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Table 7: Willingness-to-Pay for Different Retirement Plan Types with Mediators
DC rather than FAS
Low
Medium
High

CB rather than FAS
Low
Medium
High

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.004
(0.011)

-0.029***
(0.007)

-0.046***
(0.010)

-0.017
(0.012)

-0.015**
(0.007)

-0.031***
(0.011)

Conscientiousness

-0.021**
(0.010)

-0.029***
(0.007)

-0.028***
(0.010)

-0.010
(0.010)

-0.023***
(0.007)

-0.021**
(0.011)

Financial Literacy

-0.001
(0.012)

-0.022**
(0.009)

-0.039***
(0.007)

0.001
(0.013)

-0.008
(0.009)

-0.034***
(0.007)

-0.029***
(0.009)

-0.033***
(0.009)

-0.020**
(0.008)

-0.027***
(0.009)

-0.011
(0.008)

Cognitive Ability

Risk tolerance

-0.019**
(0.010)

Notes: Willingness-to-pay estimates from equation (4) based on results from logistic regression of
the model in equation (2). Models include all job conditions and state and question fixed effects.
N=40,878. Low-cognitive ability and conscientiousness teachers are in the first quartile; Mediumcognitive ability and conscientiousness teachers are in the second and third quartiles Highcognitive ability and conscientiousness teachers are in the fourth quartile. Low-financial literacy
teachers answer 0 or 1 of 3 questions correctly; Medium-financial literacy teachers answer 2 of 3
questions correctly; High-financial literacy teachers answer all questions correctly. Low-risk
tolerance teachers are unwilling to take the job when the potential pay cut is less than 10 percent;
Medium-risk tolerance teachers are willing to take the job when the potential pay cut is between
10 and 20 percent; High-risk tolerance teachers are willing to take the job when the potential pay
cut is greater than 20 percent. Probability weights included. Standard errors calculated using delta
method with clustering by individual in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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APPENDIX A: HYPOTHETICAL JOB COMPARISON CONSTRUCTION
We use a four-step procedure to construct the hypothetical job offers presented to
respondents by randomizing salary offers and one non-salary job conditions. We start by randomly
generating two salary perturbations from a normal distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation
0.05. These perturbations are multiplied by the respondents’ reported salaries to create the salary
offers in our hypothetical job scenarios. Next, we randomly choose one of the seven possible nonsalary job conditions where each job condition has the same likelihood of being selected. Then,
we randomly pick one value corresponding with the selected job condition to vary from the job
condition’s baseline value. We then randomly pick whether the baseline job is offered as Job A or
Job B and assign the relevant job condition values and salary perturbations. In the final step,
salaries are assigned to teachers to prevent strictly dominating job offers. We assume that teachers
would always select a job that corresponds with a higher salary and a larger replacement rate,
earlier retirement, higher salary growth, smaller class sizes, or additional health insurance. For
example, we would always expect respondents to choose the job that offers 8 percent annual salary
growth and a $50,000 salary instead of the job that offers 5 percent annual salary growth and a
$49,000 salary. Switching the salary offer forces a meaningful comparison about a respondent’s
willingness to pay for the extra 3 percentage points of salary growth. We have no prior expectation
for one value for retirement plan type or for Social Security eligibility to strictly dominate in the
same way that our other job condition values dominate.
Next, we create a table for the job offers and place the salaries in the corresponding job
columns. Next, we fill in the baseline job offer column with the set of unvaried baseline job
conditions. The randomly selected job condition is filled in next with the randomly chosen
condition value. The rows corresponding with the randomly selected job condition and salaries are
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shaded to increase visibility to respondents about how the job offers are different. Key differing
text in the randomly selected job condition and the salary are bolded. The rest of the table is filled
in with the baseline job offer. Figure 1 is an example of two job offers where both jobs are exactly
the same other than the retirement ages and salaries.
When teachers in the sample do not provide their salary information, we use their state
average teacher salary rounded to the nearest $10,000. State average teacher salaries are also used
when respondents’ reported salaries are under $10,000. If respondents do not indicate which state
they teach in, we use the national average teacher salary instead.
If class size is the job condition randomly selected, we either add or subtract 3 students
from the state average school level class size rounded to the nearest integer. We consider
elementary teachers to be those who teach grade K-6 and secondary teachers to be those who teach
grades 7-12. Again, the national average school level class size is imputed if respondents do not
indicate which state they teach in. Respondents leaving our question for the grades they teach
blank or who indicate they teach elementary and secondary grades are assigned the average values
corresponding to secondary schools. We obtain average teacher salaries and average class sizes
information from the Digest of Education Statistics (Snyder et al., 2019).1

1

State average class sizes for the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, and Rhode Island are not
reported due to a failure of reporting standards to be met. See Table 209.30 of the Digest of Education Statistics for
additional information (Snyder et al., 2019).
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